Southwest Airlines Flight 1248: A Case Study Using the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System Framework
Shaddi Abdala

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Abstract
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a
human factors accident analysis framework that facilitates the investigation of
active failures by frontline employees as well as organizational factors
upstream in the organization. The HFACS addresses human errors and
violations and the human factors underpinning them at four levels: unsafe acts
of operators; preconditions for unsafe acts; unsafe supervision; and
organizational influences. In this study, Southwest Airlines flight 1248 will be
analyzed using the HFACS model and could demonstrate the importance of
this framework as a tool to facilitate the investigation of the underlying causes
of human errors and violations. Moreover, it helps accident investigators
develop more effective safety interventions designed to mitigate latent
conditions and unsafe acts, greatly improving aviation safety. Findings of this
study are expected to suggest that active failures by the flight crew that
contributed to the mishap were a consequence of deeper organizational
problems, such as an unhealthy safety culture and failure of upper-level
management to provide the pilots with consistent training.

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
The HFACS framework was originally introduced to reduce the number of
accidents in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps caused by human error in 1990 by
Dr. Shappell and Dr. Wiegmann (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2007). The HFACS
model successfully identifies errors by front line personnel and latent conditions
upstream in the organization at the four levels depicted in Figure 2, with their
respective subcategories.
In theory, one failure will occur at each level of the model to result in an
adverse event. The HFACS model’s use of a four level structure for identifying
causal failures, has enabled investigation teams to diagnose the mistakes made
in the upper levels of the organization that led to the unsafe acts by frontline
employees
resulting
in
an
aircraft
accident.

The Accident- Southwest Airlines Flight 1248

National Transportation Safety Board Investigation
An accident investigation was conducted by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), the probable cause of the accident was determined to
be the pilots’ active failure to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after
touchdown, their delay resulted in a runway overrun. Additionally,
organizational failures of Southwest Airlines’ were identified to include:
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Organizational Influences: Southwest Airlines’ failure to provide
standardized operational guidance for pilots on the topics of thrust reverser
policies, mixed braking action reports, and auto brakes procedures
Unsafe Supervision: Organizational failure to explicitly and routinely
introduce the previously mentioned topics in pilot training to allow appropriate
time for familiarization of procedures
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: Poor meteorological conditions including
heavy snow, low visibility, and poor runway braking action combined with
poor aeronautical decision making by the pilots resulting from lack of standard
procedures training
Unsafe Acts: Crew’s failure to immediately apply reverse thrusters upon
touchdown, correctly calculate arrival landing distances on the on board
performance computer, familiarly operate autobrake system

Conclusion

Figure 2. The HFACS framework. Adapted from the HFACS model developed
by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003).
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The focus of this accident study was to identify the failures in a top-down
approach at each of the four levels of the HFACS framework that failed to be
corrected before the mishap occurred.

By applying the HFACS framework to Southwest Airlines flight 1248, latent
failures in the upper levels of organizational operation are identified as
conditions that prompted unsafe acts by the crewmembers.

On December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines flight 1248, a Boeing 7377H4, overran runway 31 center (31C) after landing at Chicago Midway
International Airport (Figure 1). The aircraft rolled into the road outside of
the airport perimeter and struck an automobile, killing a child inside. The
aircraft was substantially damaged. The day of the accident, weather
conditions were near approach minimums and there were mixed braking
action reports (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007).

Figure 1. Front view of Southwest Airlines flight 1248 crash. Source: Flight
Safety Foundation. (Used with permission).

Findings

1) failure to properly introduce and train its pilots on company guidelines
regarding procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations;
2) programming and design of the on board performance computer, which
did not present inherent assumptions in the program critical to pilot decisionmaking;
3) implementing new autobrake procedures without a required
familiarization period; and
4) lack of procedures to calculate a safety margin in arrival assessment to
consider
operational
uncertainties.

The analysis of the accident involving Southwest Airlines flight 1248,
using the HFACS framework, clearly demonstrated that latent failures in the
upper organizational levels can propagate to operations at lower levels and
create conditions for unsafe acts to occur as active failures by crewmembers.
The HFACS framework can be proactively applied to appropriately identify
latent failures that require attention for successful mitigation and prevention
of similar future accidents.
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